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Organizing Opposition in the Teachers' 
Movement in Oaxaca 
MARIA LORENA COOK 
What was won must be Judged 
by what was possible. 
In the second half of the 1970s, dissident unionists in Mexico directed their 
efforts to organizing within official labor unions and confederations (San 
Juan 1984:120). This move was influenced by both strategic and structural 
considerations: Most workers were located in official organizations, and the 
government was no longer as willing to recognize independent unions. Still, 
given union leaders' strong opposition to internal dissent, their government 
support, and superior access to resources, dissident organizing within official 
unions was tantamount to organizing "in the belly of the beast." The effort 
required to organize an opposition movement in this context was enormous, 
the costs high, and the gains limited. Teachers in Mexico nevertheless 
managed to sustain one of the largest and longest-lived opposition movements 
of the last twenty years in Mexico' s largest official union, the National Union 
of Workers in Education (the SNTE). 
The rank-and-file teachers' movement in Mexico emerged in 1979-
1980 within union locals throughout the country. It arose in response to 
declining real wages,1 serious paycheck delays, outdated regional wage 
differentials,2 poor health services, corruption, and the lack of democracy 
within the union. In 1979 several regional teachers' movements formed the 
dissident CNTE, the National Coordinating Committee of Workers in 
Education. In 1980-1981 movements in the states of Oaxaca, Chiapas, 
Morelos, Guerrero, and Hidalgo, and in the Valle de Mexico fought for 
economic demands and for the right to elect new local committees, ridding 
these of leaders linked to the Revolutionary Vanguard, the group that had 
exerted control over the union since 1972. Whereas all of the regional 
movements shared this political goal, only the Oaxacan and Chiapas 
movements obtained official recognition and control over their locals.3 
Chiapas Local 7 maintained this control until 1987, when the executive 
committee was decertified by national union officials, and Oaxaca retained 
control throughout the decade. In 1989 the teachers' movement reemerged 
nationally and democratic control of locals was again extended to Chiapas as 
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well as to primary and preschool teachers in Mexico City (see Arriaga 1981; 
Hernandez 1986,1989; Hernandez and Perez Arce 1982;Pelaez 1980-1984; 
and Salinas and Imaz Gispert 1984). 
This essay examines the continuing struggle of rank-and-file teachers to 
democratize the SNTE, aunion of between 800,000 and one million members 
linked to the PRI. In particular, the essay analyzes the dissident movement's 
strategy of organizing to hold and win elections in union locals, and assesses 
the advantages and limitations of this strategy over a ten-year period (1979-
1989). What were the implications of organizing within an official union for 
the movement's internal organization, demands, strategies, and ability to 
achieve its goals? 
This essay is divided into three parts. The first looks at the official union 
as an institution that structured the protest movement within it. The laws, 
procedures, organizational structure, and leadership of the union set 
boundaries forthemovement's actions, shaping, thoughnot fully determining, 
its demands, strategies, organization, and what it was able to achieve. The 
second part examines how the movement overcame some of these constraints 
in pursuing a legal or institutional strategy to democratize the union. This 
part also analyzes the gains and limitations of the movement's legal strategy 
as experienced by those sections of the movement that obtained legal 
recognition. The last part looks at how changes in the movement's political 
environment affected the ability to achieve its goals. This section focuses on 
the Oaxacan case and argues that the relations between government and 
union officials were crucial to understanding the movement's important 
breakthroughs, as well as the limits to organizing within official unions. 
THE OFFICIAL UNION AS STRUCTURING INSTITUTION 
The CNTE's decision to organize within rather than outside the union was 
the outcome of both a political struggle among leaders of the movement and 
an encounter with legal and political barriers to independent union 
organization (Hernandez and Perez Arce 1982). Public-sector employees 
were governed by a separate section of the labor code that permitted only one 
unionin each sector. Most dissident public-sector workers therefore organized 
factions within their unions, in some instances winning local or delegation 
executive committees. At the time the dissident CNTE was formed, it had the 
support of approximately 15 percent of the SNTE membership, far below the 
majority it would have needed to force the government to recognize an 
alternate union. As a result, the CNTE remained within the union and 
pursued a legal strategy that involved organizing to win control of local 
executive committees through elections. Union positions could then be used 
to support and extend the democratic movement (Hernandez and Perez Arce 
1982:41). 
The fact that the movement emerged and remained within an official 
union shaped its composition, demands, and organizational structure. Move-
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ment participants came together by virtue of their profession and their 
membership in the union (which included manual and administrative workers 
as well as teachers). The movement's organization closely paralleled the 
levels of organization within the union locals (delegations, local committees), 
and the union local was the principal unit of organization for the movement. 
The CNTE thus represented an alliance of regional (local) movements within 
the union, rather than an alliance across sectors between popular organiza-
tions, and it was structured as a loose network of local movements that 
retained regional autonomy. 
The professional membership of the union shaped the movement's 
demands as well. In spite of the peasant and working-class origins of many 
teachers and the important role they played in poor communities, the 
demands of the teachers' movement corresponded to the specific economic 
and professional needs of union members. Nevertheless, many teachers 
participated in peasant struggles for land, in opposing municipal elections, 
and in organizing for basic services in communities (Hernandez 1988a). The 
CNTE was also instrumental in forging alliances with other popular 
organizations to oppose government austerity policies and repression against 
the organizations in the mid-1980s (Prieto 1986:89). The union's primarily 
female membership did not appear to have shaped the movement's demands 
in a central way. The leadership of the movement, as well as of the union, was 
overwhelmingly male dominated, and even some of the most militant women 
participants felt that to introduce "women's" demands would be to risk 
dividing the movement. Recently male and female attitudes toward the role 
of women in the movement have begun to change as a result of several years 
of men and women participating equally in the movement, if not in leadership 
positions. 
The teachers' movement maintained a position of autonomy with respect 
to political parties. According to the rank and file, union leaders' commitments 
to the government party were responsible for their failure to represent 
members. The party-union separation, however, was also an effort to curb 
party factionalism and maintain unity within the teachers' movement. 
Because of widespread rank-and-file mistrust of political parties and party 
activists, further restrictions were placed on the participation of political 
parties and currents within the movement, even though the most active 
movement participants typically belonged to some political organization. 
Members recognized political organizations' contributions to the movement, 
yet they rejected attempts to place party interests above the interests of the 
teachers' movement.4 
The centralized structure of the union inhibited expressions of dissent. 
The National Executive Committee (CEN) authorized all electoral congresses 
at the local level, controlled the distribution of finances to the locals, and held 
important powers of intervention at local and delegation assemblies (de la 
Garza Toledo 1982:40-43). Nevertheless, officials regularly denied 
authorization of electoral congresses for political reasons, and finances 
normally allocated to local committees were withheld by national union 
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authorities as a way of pressuring dissident locals. Union officials could also 
draw on the statutes to suspend or expel workers for "disloyalty, lack of 
discipline, and treason," and for activities said to "threaten the unity and 
integrity of the union," charges used to control the activities of dissidents 
within the union (de la Garza Toledo 1982:41). The history of labor conflict 
within the union was also marked by the use of violence—the intimidation, 
beating, kidnapping, imprisonment, and murder of union dissidents. In 1989 
the Mexican news agency Notimex estimated that 150 union dissidents had 
been killed since the beginning of the movement (see Uno mas Uno, April 24, 
1989). 
The SNTE was dominated by a faction that came to power in 1972 after 
illegally expelling the secretary general of the union. The act was a coup by 
one faction, led by Carlos Jonguitud Barrios, against another that had been 
in power since 1949. The support of the Echeverrfa administration for the 
new leadership was evident in the economic, material, and institutional 
concessions the union obtained throughout the remainder of the president's 
term (Hernandez 1982b:48-49; Pelaez 1984:166). Jonguitud used the 
considerable resources of the union to raise his and the union's political 
profile (Greaves 1980:91). He also set about to consolidate his control of the 
union by creating the Revolutionary Vanguard, a political-ideological 
instrument of the union leadership. Jonguitud was named president-for-life 
of the Vanguard, enabling him to circumvent union statutes that prevented 
reelection and to retain control of the union after his term as secretary general 
ended. 
The Revolutionary Vanguard developed an impressive membership 
network. In the states, vanguardistas occupied administrative positions and 
controlled school districts and the careers of teachers through clientelism 
and corruption (Hernandez 1982b:49-50). Union officials also held 
government and party positions at national, state, and municipal levels, 
blurring the boundaries between union and state power and providing 
vanguardistas with external resources to extend their control. Jonguitud 
himself became a member of the PRI's National Executive Committee, 
president of the Labor Congress, director general of the ISSSTE (the social 
security agency for public employees), and governor of the state of San Luis 
Potosf. Opposition to the Vanguard and its practices became one of the 
defining elements of the teachers' movement. As one teacher from Oaxaca 
put it, "People may not be very clear about what they're fighting for, but 
they're clear about being against the Vanguard," (personal interview, 
February 1987). 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE LEGAL STRATEGY 
The movement's pursuit of a legal strategy to democratize the union had 
several implications and consequences. In pursuing this legal strategy, the 
movement was forced to adopt extralegal and even illegal tactics. The 
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clearest expression of the use of both was evident in the organization of the 
movement. By controlling the statutory or formally recognized structures of 
the union, the movement could officially claim to represent its members and 
legally bargain on their behalf. But the movement also created alternative 
organizations that derived their legitimacy from member support and use 
rather than from official recognition. One document from the movement 
noted, "We should leam to make broad use of legality, but we should also 
create our own forms of organization and struggle, even though these may 
not be legal from the point of view of the charro statutes or the repressive 
government" (SNTE, Secci6n 7 1983:16). 
The first organizations of the movement were strike committees (comites 
de lucha), organized roughly by delegation or several delegations together. 
Committee representatives then made up the central struggle committee, 
which made decisions for the movement. Central struggle committees 
formed in most of the insurgent locals during 1979-1981. In most cases, the 
organizations of the movement existed alongside the legal structures of the 
local. After legality, both the Oaxacan and Chiapas movements made 
additional changes to the parallel and statutory organizations, in a conscious 
effort to increase member participation in decisionmaking. A state assembly 
composed of representatives from each delegation (including the rank and 
file and delegation officials) took primacy over the local executive committee 
in making decisions that affected the entire local. Important proposals 
presented at state assembly meetings were taken back to the delegations and 
schools for consultation with the membership. These issues were discussed 
at workplace and delegation meetings, and the decisions reached were taken 
back to the next state assembly meeting, where a vote was taken. In general, 
workplace, delegation, and regional problems were resolved at the 
corresponding organizational lev els within the local. In the delegations, five-
member coordinating committees were formed in addition to the statutory 
executive committees. These coordinating committees were in charge of the 
more political aspects of union organization at the delegation level, such as 
promoting member participation and education. Coordinating committees 
were also created at sectoral and regional levels to improve communication 
within the local and to decentralize the resolution of problems. 
Legal status, however, did not guarantee that the movement's demands 
would be met or even heard. As a rule, the movement presented its demands 
through the established channels. Movement participants tried to get local 
and national union officials to spearhead or respond to demands, before 
attempting direct tactics that ranged from ousting the officials to bypassing 
them in order to appeal directly to higher authorities. Often, however, the 
locals were forced to rely on their ability to mobilize supporters and their 
capacity to disrupt. Mobilizations were typically combined with legal appeals 
and negotiations. That members decided the actions they would take 
strengthened the membership's ability to engage repeatedly in collective 
action; members had control over, and therefore some commitment to, 
movement activities. As a result, the mobilizations were often a reliable 
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gauge of the movement's strength. 
The membership of the democratic locals developed a degree of autonomy 
that enabled it to resist continued attacks. Members questioned and challenged 
their elected leaders and eventually selected new representatives whom they 
perceived as being closer to their own interests; these were usually people 
who had less contact with union and government officials. Members 
frequently insisted on sustaining mobilizations longer than their leaders did; 
in Oaxaca in 1985-1986 and Chiapas in 1987, members demonstrated that 
they were willing to mobilize for political demands alone—for democratic 
elections in theirlocals. These and other developments signaled that members 
were increasingly unlikely to accept the paternalism and clientelism that 
were pervasive in other parts of the union. 
The electoral renewal of the local committees highlighted the central 
dilemma of the movement's legal strategy. Continuity of the movement's 
legal status depended on the CEN's willingness to authorize the elections. 
Union officials used their power to authorize local elections in order to 
pressure the movement into giving up seats on its executive committee. 
When this strategy failed, officials withheld authorization in an effort to 
divide and weaken the movement. Fighting the CEN on this issue called for 
a tremendous mobilization of resources, and the failure to advance on the 
election issue generated tensions within the movement. Differences developed 
between some members of the executive committee and the state assembly 
over tactics: the leaders' excessive reliance on negotiations against the use 
of mobilizations, and whether to focus on the election issue exclusively (a 
regional issue) or broaden demands to include other sectors in joint 
mobilizations. 
Executive committee leaders were often in the contradictory position of 
having to appear radical to their membership and moderate to government 
and union officials. Union and government officials pressured leaders to 
accept compromise solutions without consultingtheirmembership. Members, 
in turn, suspected leaders of negotiating behind their backs or of concealing 
information, causing them to challenge leaders openly in the state assembly. 
These internal relations were complicated by the stipulation that a new 
executive committee could not be elected without authorized elections, for 
fear that the union would use the event of unauthorized elections to impose 
its own committee. 
This lack of trust between members and some executive committee 
leaders threatened the unity of the movement. In Oaxaca, however, members 
adopted creative solutions in response to the election debate and to the 
internal strains developing from it. The state assembly rejected the option 
that the CEN was trying to impose—negotiating vanguardista 
representation on the executive committee. At the same time, the assembly 
voted to develop memberparticipation in rank-and-file organizations, expand 
the executive committee with rank-and-file assistants, improve relations 
with parents (which were strained due to the strikes), and work closely with 
other members of the CNTE in an effort to break out of isolation (FMIN 
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1985:23). The movement therefore reacted to the pressure not by centralizing 
decisionmaking, but by extending "horizontally"—developing its alliances 
and its democratic features. 
CENTRAL CONFLICT AND REGIONAL MOVEMENTS: OAXACA 
After the formation of the SNTE in 1943, the union played an important part 
in its support for the government party and for presidential candidates, 
particularly in its role as a party electoral machine during elections. In 
exchange, union leaders occupied positions in the party and government, 
becoming senators, federal deputies, party presidents, and directors of 
federal agencies. This alliance between the union and the government-party 
was not new when Jonguitud came to power, but it reached new dimensions 
under Echeverrfa. Still, the growing political and economic power of the 
union, which had made it an effective ally of the government, became an 
obstacle to government efforts to reform Mexican education in the late 
1970s. 
State-Union Conflict and the 
Emergence of the Movement, 1978-1983 
The successes and limits of the teachers' movement cannot be fully understood 
without taking into account the larger context of the union's relations with 
the government. At the beginning of the movement, conflict between the 
SNTE and officials in the Ministry of Education (SEP) under Lopez Portillo 
led state officials to tolerate the movement in order to pressure the SNTE 
(Hernandez 1986:66; Pescador and Torres 1985:4-5). Particular events 
contributed to an overall climate of conflict that benefited the dissident 
movement: the formation of the National Education University (UPN), 
changes in the requirements for the training of teachers, the union's demand 
for more deputy and senate seats and for greater participation in the 
formulation of education policy, and the deconcentration5 of the 
administration (Pel4ez 1984:207; Pescador and Torres 1985). 
The particular ways in which government-union conflict was expressed 
had different implications for rank-and-file teachers and for the opposition 
movement. The struggle over the formation of the UPN reflected deep 
differences between the government's technocrats and the more traditional 
union politicians (Kovacs 1983; Pescador and Torres 1985), but this conflict 
was relatively contained within an institution of higher education based in 
Mexico City. In contrast, the deconcentration of the SEP had an important 
impact on rank-and-file teachers. It affected practically all union members 
at once; it disrupted regional relations of power within the union without 
providing a strong substitute authority in the SEP delegation, and it forced 
union leaders to turn to the mobilization of their members rather than fall 
back on the more traditional forms of bargaining with SEP officials. As a 
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result, SEP-SNTE conflict was displaced from the arena of high-level 
negotiations, unleashing rank-and-file mobilizations that later became 
difficult to control. Moreover, members were mobilized in support of the 
specific interests of their leaders (e.g., removal of SEP delegates) but not in 
support of member needs, such as wage increases. These conditions enabled 
groups of dissident teachers to emerge and organize, and facilitated the 
formation of a national opposition movement within the union. 
In 1978 officials in the SEP initiated the administrative deconcentration 
of the ministry in order to address the problems associated with the enormous 
size and centralization of the system. Among these problems was the lack of 
information about and control over the availability, use, and distribution of 
resources in the states, and severe delays in the issuance of employee 
paychecks. The goal of the administrative reform consisted of modernizing 
educational planning and the personnel administration by substituting 
technical criteria for the personalist criteria that had thus far prevailed in the 
allocation and distribution of resources (Street 1984:18). A related, though 
unwritten, objective of the deconcentration was to launch a surprise attack on 
the power base of the union in the states, in order to "cut the octopus's 
tentacles" (personal interview with SEP official, September 1987). The 
ministry thus set out to undermine the union's pervasive influence over SEP 
personnel in the states, which was seen as the main obstacle to reform. 
Before 1978 theunion'spower was based on its control of the assignment, 
administration, and promotion of personnel, through a chain of command 
that linked school directors and superintendents with federal directors and 
directors general of education in the states, many of whom were loyal to the 
union (Street 1984:18). The deconcentration tightened central control over 
these processes by establishing one delegation in each state and granting the 
SEP delegates—who answered directly to the education minister—control 
overthe programming of resources and matters relating to teaching personnel, 
undermining the authority previously enjoyed by the directors general 
(Street 1984:15-16). 
These measures threw the SEP into "a brutal confrontation with the 
union" (personal interview with SEP official, August 1987). Union officials 
responded by refusing to cooperate with the new delegates. In many cases, 
strikes and building occupations were organized by the union in order to 
pressure the SEP into removing delegates. The conflict over the deconcentra-
tion thus took place in the states, upset regional power relations, and directly 
affected rank-and-file teachers. At the same time, the creation of SEP 
delegations increased the autonomy of union locals vis-a-vis the National 
Executive Committee by making the channels of communication between 
the SEP and teachers more direct, and also by making the delegations more 
vulnerable to pressure from union members at the regional level (Pescador 
and Torres 1985:50-51). 
The SEP also planned to decentralize the system of payment to SEP 
employees in response to a severe payments crisis in which employees 
typically received paychecks months behind schedule. The payments problem 
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spread discontent among rank-and-file teachers and was used by union 
officials as a mobilizing tool to protest the administrative reforms. In 
Oaxaca, prior to the emergence of the movement, local union officials 
mobilized members around the payments issue in a campaign to oust the SEP 
delegate. Theircall to strike backfired, however, when rank-and-file teachers 
moved beyond the demands of their local officials in May 1980 and called 
for wage increases and the removal of the local executive committee (Yescas 
Martinez and Zafra 1985:105-106). Many delegation officials, dissatisfied 
with the way the new secretary general had been selected during a local 
congress held earlier that year, also joined the emerging movement. 
Delegation committee representatives voted to reject the executive 
committee on May 13, 1980 (Pelaez 1980:72; Yescas Martinez and Zafra 
1985:94). A commission tried to negotiate with national union officials to 
hold new elections, but national authorities threw their support behind the 
rejected secretary general. The dissident teachers then went to Mexico City 
in order to pressure the National Executive Committee to spearhead their 
demands and to authorize new elections. Both the CEN and the Ministry of 
Education promised to address the movement's demands, but negotiations 
with the Oaxaca commission were abandoned after verbal agreements led 
Oaxacan teachers to lift their strike and return to their state. Finally, a day-
long work stoppage was called by the CNTE on June 9, 1980, and 
approximately 70,000 teachers—including contingents from Chiapas, 
Morelos, Guerrero, Queretaro, Mexico City, and the Valle de Mexico— 
marched and then camped out in front of SEP and SNTE offices in Mexico 
City (Pelaez 1980:78). After twenty-four hours and the CEN's refusal to 
negotiate the movement's economic demands, the Ministry of the Interior 
intervened and led the CEN to the negotiating table with the Oaxaca 
commission. The CEN was forced by the Ministry of the Interior to accept 
a transitional executive commission in Oaxaca, in which all twelve members 
except for the president would be elected by the dissidents, and the president 
would be appointed by the CEN. This arrangement represented a structural 
change in the union local's government that opened the possibility of 
democratic elections. Other regional movements reached similar agreements 
in the ensuing months. 
The reasons for the Ministry of the Interior's hard-line position with 
officials of the SNTE probably ran deeper than the union's inability to keep 
its members from erupting onto the streets of Mexico City. The government 
may have been interested in curbing the SNTE's power in the context of the 
presidential succession, particularly given the union's demands for political 
appointments and for the position of education minister in the next 
administration. The interior minister had also been an executive committee 
member in the SNTE in the late 1950s, when it was dominated by the faction 
that Jonguitud later ousted in 1972. 
Although an interim commission was established in Oaxaca, CEN 
officials dragged their feet in authorizing elections. Repeated mobilizations, 
together with pressure on the part of the governor of Oaxaca, finally enabled 
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Oaxacan teachers to elect a new local committee in February 1982. 
The State-Union Alliance, 1983-1988 
The 1982 change in administration and the economic crisis altered the 
context of government-union relations and affected conditions for the 
dissident movement. The new SEP minister, Jesus Reyes Heroles, still came 
into conflict with the union over the decentralization of education, but the 
government was also harsher on dissident movements. The labor movement's 
initial militant reaction to the economic crisis was halted by the de la Madrid 
administration's firm response to labor protests in 1983. The new 
administration also dealt a blow to the CNTE by decentralizing the National 
Teachers College in Mexico City and closing its main campus. The school 
had been operating as the unofficial headquarters of the CNTE and was a 
meeting place for movement leaders from all over the country who attended 
its summer courses. The economic crisis also marked the beginning of a 
period (1982-1989) in which teachers' real wages would fall by 63 percent 
(Guzman Ortiz and Vela Glez 1989:47). The crisis generated discontent but 
also limited the possibility of winning economic demands, and it reduced the 
amount of time teachers could devote to the movement as many teachers 
were forced to seek additional income. 
The pressure of a mass movement on the government had also largely 
disappeared. The CNTE's last large national mobilization was during the 
June 1983 strike wave. By 1982-1983, the CNTE was fighting its battles 
regionally rather than nationally: Oaxaca and Chiapas already had their 
democratic executive committees, and Morelos, the Valle de Mexico, Hidalgo, 
and Guerrero had been weakened. 
By 1983 union officials of the SNTE had had time to reorganize 
(Hernandez 1986:69; Prieto 1986:79). The reduction of substantive conflict 
with the state by the end of 1983 also released the CEN to focus on the 
dissident movement in the states. In their strategy to recover old losses and 
preempt new ones, CEN officials sent top cadres to Oaxaca and Chiapas in 
order to organize opposition to the democratic locals. In October 1983, 
vanguardistas occupied union headquarters in Oaxaca and took several 
democratic members hostage. A large crowd of teachers and supporters 
gathered outside, and eventually police were sent in to remove the occupants. 
Days later, vanguardistas in the state formed a parallel executive committee 
in an effort to take over executive functions and win members away from the 
democratic local, but the attempt failed. In addition, union officials had 
already begun to lash out at the dissident movement in other states, violating 
agreements for electoral congresses with movements in Hidalgo, Morelos, 
and the Valle de Mexico. 
After Reyes Heroles's death in 1985, Miguel Gonzalez Avelar was 
appointed to head the SEP. The new education minister adopted a conciliatory 
position toward the union; his interest in the presidential nomination appeared 
to weaken his resolve to delimit the power and activities of the union. The 
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SNTE was able to negotiate the appointment of directors of the delegations, 
now called Educational Services Units to be Decentralized, or USED 
(Martmez Assad and Ziccardi 1988:37-38).' Union resistance to SEP 
delegates had already given way in many states to a greater vanguardista 
presence in the delegations, the removal of unpopular delegates, and power 
sharing in some areas (Pescador and Torres 1985:50-51; Street 1984:20-
21). 
This alliance between state and union officials greatly narrowed the 
Oaxacan movement's access to political and economic resources and limited 
the effectiveness of its mobilizations. National union officials began a 
campaign to wear out the movement by extending, then retracting, authoriza-
tion for local elections to renew the executive committee. Union officials 
withheld authorization of the Oaxaca local's elections every year between 
1985 and 1989 until after Jonguitud's removal from the union. Leaders that 
were to have remained in office for only three years, according to union 
statutes, were forced to remain at the head of the movement for seven. 
According to movement leaders, after 1985 the USED began to employ 
vanguardistas who blocked petitions coming from the local. National union 
authorities also cut off the local's share of dues remissions in May 1986. 
Vanguardistas were sent to work at schools without appropriate credentials 
and in violation of earlier agreements the movement had forged with the SEP 
on the criteria for transfers and hiring. National union officials attacked the 
movement on all fronts, threatening simultaneously its ability to bargain and 
petition on behalf of its members, its legal status and formal continuity, its 
access to resources, and its unity. The movement's few resources were 
diverted to fight battles in the schools, and conflict with the local SEP offices 
increased. The limited autonomy of the democratic locals—their vulnerability 
to the actions of national union officials—was never more evident than 
during this period. 
Months of mobilizing with limited results placed the Oaxacan organiza-
tion under tremendous pressure and strain. Nonetheless, it remained unified 
between 1985 and 1988, managing to avoid the divisive factionalism that had 
become public in the Chiapas leadership (Campa 1988). In February 1989 
the Oaxaca local elected a new executive committee during its precongress, 
for the second time since 1985, and again national officials postponed the 
congress date.7 After the teachers' movement gained strength nationwide in 
April and May and Jonguitud was removed from the union, the executive 
committee was finally ratified in the presence of the new secretary general 
of the SNTE, Elba Esther Gordillo. 
The Renewal of Conflict, 1989 
After the presidential elections of July 1988, national political conditions in 
Mexico changed. For Mexico City residents in particular, the success of 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas's presidential campaign (the cardenistas won the 
capital) provided a needed boost to popular organizing efforts throughout the 
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city and eroded the authority of the Salinas administration. At the same time, 
the dramatic arrest of the leader of the Mexican oil workers' union in January 
1989 was a sign from Salinas that traditional labor bosses were no longer 
inviolate, rekindling old demands for union democracy in a number of areas. 
Meanwhile, the SNTE reverted to its traditional methods of manipulating 
delegation assemblies throughout the country and obstructing the opposition 
in the selection of delegates to its national congress in February. The 
discontent generated by these maneuvers and by Jonguitud's tight control 
over positions of union power revealed dissension among former allies of the 
union boss. Severe wage erosion had also spread the discontent to locals 
throughout the country. 
These factors converged in the spring of 1989 to produce one of the 
largest teachers' strikes in the history of the SNTE. The dissident movement 
encompassed far more than the traditional CNTE centers of support. It 
included rank-and-file members who had never participated in the movement, 
as well as disgruntled vanguardistas and other factions of union officials. 
The Salinas government seized upon this moment to displace a union boss 
whose internal support and benefit to the political system had seriously 
deteriorated. In the wake of this removal, the striking teachers succeeded in 
extending democratic union local committees to Oaxaca, Chiapas, and to the 
union's largest local—Local 9 of primary and preschool teachers in Mexico 
City. In other locals, dissidents gained representation on temporary executive 
commissions and obtained agreements to hold elections. In spite of later 
setbacks, the dissident teachers achieved more during this period than they 
had at any point since the founding of the CNTE in 1979. 
Prior to the reemergence of the dissident movement in 1989, the general 
refusal of union and government officials to respond to the movement's 
demands—and in particular, to requests for elections—appeared to signal 
the effective containment of the movement. The events in early 1989, 
however, offer the clearest evidence of the difference that changes in the 
political environment make for popular movements, particularly for those 
contained within official institutions. The movement's successes during this 
period reflected a decade of CNTE activism and experience and the 
consolidation of the democratic movements in Oaxaca and Chiapas. But the 
closure of union and government authorities and the limited gains of the 
movement between 1983 and 1988 contrasted sharply with the movement's 
advances of 1989. It took the convergence of state-union conflict with the 
massive mobilization of discontented union members to achieve 
breakthroughs similar to those of the 1979-1981 period. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The democratic teachers' movement in Mexico highlights the limits and 
possibilities of organizing opposition within official unions. The institutional 
and legal context in which the movement emerged precluded some strategic 
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choices from being adopted; instead of organizing as an independent union, 
the movement remained within the union. As a result, the movement had to 
confront the constraints to dissident organizing inherent in the union's 
statutes, organizational structures, leadership, and political ties. Inemploying 
both legal and extralegal measures to circumvent some of these constraints 
and gain a foothold within the union, the dissident movement used legality 
but was not bound by it. 
The legal strategy pursued by the movement had positive consequences, 
but it also presented the democratic locals with a dilemma. During an initial 
period of increased autonomy for the movements, internal structures and 
procedures were altered to broadenmemberparticipation in decisionmaking 
and to increase the accountability of leaders. Legal status facilitated the 
democratization of the movement, which in turn influenced a new generation 
of teachers that entered the movement in the 1980s. But continuity of the 
movement's legal status depended on its securing the permission of its 
enemies—national union officials. This was the dilemma and central 
constraint of the legal strategy. 
Changes in the movement's larger political environment, and the way 
the movement took advantage of these, were therefore crucial to its 
development. State-union conflict aided the emergence of the national 
teachers' movement, and government intervention in negotiations produced 
important changes and advances forthe movement (representation on interim 
committees and election timetables). On these occasions, pressure by the 
dissident movement converged with a government interest in applying 
leverage against SNTE officials. In contrast, when union officials were not 
constrained or had the cooperation of government officials, they succeeded 
in changing conditions in the states so that opposition locals found it more 
difficult to manage and gains were increasingly limited. 
The lack of a political opening rendered the movement's mobilization 
strategy ineffective and placed strong pressure on movement leaders to 
negotiate and compromise without mobilizing their forces. At the same time, 
however, the democratic organization of the membership kept pressure on 
leaders and forced them to remain accountable to members despite the lack 
of elections. As a result, the movement was able to survive intact in spite of 
its hostile environment. The dissident teachers' movement thus draws 
attention to the opportunities presented by conflicts within official institutions 
and to internal democracy as important elements in the organization and 
survival of popular movements. 
NOTES 
This essay is based on research supported by the Inter-American Foundation 
in 1986-1987. This write-up of the research was supported by a fellowship from the 
Centerfor U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, during 1988— 
1989.1 want to thank Paul Haber for comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
I alone am responsible for the errors or misinterpretations that remain. The results 
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of this larger research project, as well as details on the points presented in this 
chapter, can be found in Cook 1990. 
The epigraph at the beginning of this chapter is taken from Piven and Cloward, 
1979:xiii. 
1. Real wages for teachers began to fall after 1976, recovered slightly during the 
peak of the movement (1979-1981), then plummeted after 1981. On teachers' wages 
see Aboites 1984 and 1986, and Guzman Ortiz and Vela Glez 1989. 
2. These differentials were calculated as a percentage of the base wage. The 
percentages varied from one region to the next, reflecting differences in the cost of 
living. At the time of the Chiapas movement's emergence in 1979, the regional 
differentials had not been adjusted in thirty years. 
3. In Chiapas two locals, one of federalized teachers (Local 7) and one of state 
teachers (Local 40), obtained this status. Both belonged to the SNTE. This essay 
focuses on the federalized teachers. 
4. The formation of the Party of the Democratic Revolution under Cardenas 
(PRD) has since led some groups to reassess the movement's relationship to political 
parties. 
5. Deconcentration was the first phase in the planned decentralization of public 
education in Mexico. Deconcentration referred to the delegation of authority to a 
lower level of the SEP, whereas decentralization referred to the transfer of 
responsibility and resources for education to state governments. For an excellent 
analysis of the deconcentration of the SEP and its effects on the union, see Street 
1983 and 1984. On decentralization see Martinez Assad and Ziccardi 1988, and 
Pescador and Torres 1985. 
6. See also "Carta de la CNTE a Bartlett" in La Jornada, October 23,1987:"The 
majority of ministry positions have been turned over to them, so that almost all of 
the educational services units and the regional services coordinating committees in 
the states are occupied by bureaucrats who belong to the Vanguard." 
7. The official events were presided over by representatives from the CEN, so 
prior events were held to elect congress delegates and executive committee slates, 
so as to avoid confrontations and divisions at the official congress. In Oaxaca, 
delegate selection had taken place in 1985, but the precongress was postponed; in 
1986 the precongress was held. On both occasions, the CEN rescinded authorization 
for the congresses at the last minute. 
